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 Book Reviews
 his call to keep dreaming of a socialist world, but they do begin to address more
 concretely and realistically the question posed in his title.
 GARY DORRIEN, Kalamazoo College.
 BURNS, J. PATOUT, ed. War and Its Discontents: Pacifism and Quietism in the Abrahamic
 Traditions. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996. xi+221 pp.
 $55.00 (cloth).
 What does it mean to ask whether Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, in the words
 ofJ. Patout Burns, "define[s] standards according to which the recourse to arms,
 either for conquest or in defense of life and justice, would be forbidden? Might
 they encourage, approve, or at least allow a pacifist stance in the contemporary
 world order?" (p. x)? If "a pacifistic stance" means preferring peace to war and
 encouraging others to do the same, the authors embrace too many diverse
 groups. Advocates of Cold War realpolitik preferred peace to war and amassed
 military stockpiles, deployed nuclear weapons, and projected American might to
 encourage others to do the same. Muslims, Christians, and Jews have for centu-
 ries insisted on absolute limits to initiating and prosecuting war, while recognizing
 that it may, nonetheless, be a lamentable necessity. Thinkers of the democratic
 left, like Michael Walzer, may abhor war without being "quietist" or "pacifistic."
 Even just war thinkers of the far right maintain that military conquest is forbidden.
 Perhaps it would be more useful to ask whether the various traditions forbid their
 adherents either to join in or endorse military force used by the public authorities
 against armed threats to justice and the integrity of the community-one way of
 drawing the distinction between pacifism and the just war tradition-or recog-
 nize noninvolvement in the armed defense of justice and the community as a
 faithful stance within the tradition-a tentative characterization of quietism.
 Put in these terms, pacifism turns out to have little credibility, quietism a bit
 more. Thus, Michael Broyde, surveying the Jewish traditions, insists that "theo-
 logical pacifism has no place in the Jewish tradition" (p. 19). Everett Gendler,
 Yehudah Mirsky, and Naomi Goodman emphasize the Jewish commitment to
 peace, instance cases of martyrdom, risk-taking, and nonviolent strategies as ways
 of responding to aggression and injustice, without seriously challenging Broyde's
 central claim. Similarly, Abdulaziz Sachedina, while insisting "that Islam is not
 monolithic," concludes nonetheless that "pacifism in the sense of rejecting all
 forms of violence and opposing all war and armed hostility before justice is estab-
 lished has no place in the Qur'anic doctrine of human faith" (p. 147). Justice is
 God's unequivocal demand and cannot be forsaken by God's community. Quiet-
 ism, in contrast, is a legitimate "strategy for survival in minority communities
 with the hope of regrouping and reasserting their ideals ofjustice" (p. 148).
 Sachedina insists on the theological point that "the search for peace and inte-
 gral existence" without acknowledging the absolute priority of God's demands
 "has proved to be fatal in human history" (p. 157). Faithfulness is emphasized
 from the Christian perspective by Edward Gaffney, who sees the triumph of "sec-
 ular pacifism" in the Vietnam-era courts as an impediment to selective conscien-
 tious objectors, thus shielding imperial America from its most serious critics (pp.
 186-89). Gaffney's concerns relate closely to those of John Yoder, who has long
 emphasized the eschatological context of the Gospel narrative and the dangers
 for the church inherent in the "constantinian temptation" to see in the state the
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 principle agent of historical fulfillment. That the Christian shoulders the "scandal
 of the cross" emphasizes the profound gulf between Yoder's pacifism and the
 natural desire to pursue justice and protect those we love. Reflected in several
 essays here, including Yoder's, is an unfortunate trend toward using '"justifiable
 war" as an alternative to "just war." Only just wars, those fought with proper au-
 thority, just cause, right intention, and the rest of the traditional criteria, are ever
 justifiable. If the wars from which we have benefited were unjust, then we benefit
 to our shame, but that scarcely supports Walter Wink's proposal "that we termi-
 nate all talk of 'just wars'" (p. 116). To claim, as Wink does, that "Christians can
 no more speak of just war than of just rape, or just child abuse, or just massacres"
 (p. 116), is dangerously confused, as well as an affront to the Catholic tradition,
 represented here by John Langan. It is also a symptom of that debasement of our
 political discourse that worries Gaffney. Wink represents the sort of simple-
 minded Christian liberalism that drove Reinhold Niebuhr out of the Fellowship
 of Reconciliation. Oddly enough, this makes his the most instructive essay in the
 volume. If pacifists and advocates of nonviolent strategies for social justice fail to
 distance themselves from shoddy argument and rhetorical posturing, they risk
 damaging their credibility and thus their cause.
 G. ScoTrr DAVIS, University of Richmond.
 REEDER, JOHN P,JR. Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger, and War. University Park:
 Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 237 pp. $35.00 (cloth); $16.95
 (paper).
 John Reeder stands in that admirable line of moral philosophers who, even in
 these postmodern times, are not ready to throw in the towel. Conceding the in-
 commensurability of various conflicting foundational premises, both secular and
 theological, Reeder nonetheless argues that the current moral landscape yields a
 coherent "consensus" on such divisive issues as abortion, physician-assisted sui-
 cide, warfare, and obligation to the starving-those wrenching questions of life
 and death which Reeder appropriately takes to be interrelated.
 Reeder's consensus, put briefly, presupposes a conception of "rights" (whether
 rooted in Kantianism or Aristotelianism or theology), including not only a (waiva-
 ble) right not to be killed, but also a right to receive aid. Reeder's rights premise
 serves as an initial check to a utilitarian calculus that is otherwise legitimate.
 Thus, except in some specified override situations, one may not kill an individual
 person to save many others, but one may redistribute preexisting threats so as to
 destroy the fewest number. Therefore, in discussing two oft-juxtaposed hypothet-
 icals, Reeder insists that a surgeon may not slay one patient to harvest vital organs
 for five, but a passenger on a runaway trolley headed toward five people may
 redirect the trolley onto a spur where it will kill one. Similarly, Reeder retains the
 double-effect test. Except in the "Nazi override" case (where the future of any
 rights-based civilization is on the line), one may not deliberately kill noncomba-
 tants to demoralize the enemy, but one may do obliteration bombing of a legiti-
 mate military target in the sure knowledge that noncombatants will be killed, so
 long as, under a proportionality test, lives thereby saved are not outweighed by
 lives taken. (Similarly, in traditional Catholic thought, one may remove a cancer-
 ous uterus knowing the fetus will die, although one may not directly kill a fetus.)
 Is consensus achieved? Reeder's approach is that of the analytic philosopher,
 proceeding by way of comparative hypothetical example. At that analytic level, I
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